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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S
CURRENT APPROACH
JAMES A. MCGURK* **
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit de-
cided numerous criminal cases during the past year.' While no single
case stands out, a number of areas of uncertainty were clarified by the
court.
This article offers a general view of current issues in federal crimi-
nal procedure in the Seventh Circuit. Only a small portion of the
court's published 2 opinions relating to criminal procedure are dis-
cussed. This article is intended to be more informative than analytical,
and is intended to direct the attention of the criminal lawyer engaged in
active federal litigation to recent cases from this circuit.
The organization of this article follows the chronology of the crim-
inal process, beginning with eyewitness identification and concluding
with sentencing and appeal. Some general comments about acknowl-
edged fundamental principles of criminal procedure are offered at the




Eyewitness identification of a defendant is often the most crucial
* Assistant United States Attorney, Northern District of Illinois; Member Illinois Bar, Uni-
versity of Illinois, B.A. 1970, J.D. 1973.
**The author wishes to express his appreciation for the assistance of Lawrence E. Just, Uni-
versity of Illinois, B.A. 1974, M.A. 1975; Illinois Institute of Technology/Chicago-Kent College of
Law, J.D. 1979. The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone, and in no way
represent the position of the United States Attorney's Office for the Northern District of Illinois,
or of the United States Department of Justice.
1. This article examines cases decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit for the period of September 1, 1977, to May 31, 1978. Certain opinions issued after
May 31, 1978, involving rehearing of earlier opinions, are also discussed.
Between September 1, 1977 and May 31, 1978, a total of 1144 appeals, both civil and crimi-
nal, were filed in the Seventh Circuit, out of which there were 961 dispositions. With respect to
criminal appeals alone, 245 were filed and 190 were terminated. Interview with Hon. Thomas F.
Strubbe, Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (Nov. 11, 1978).
2. A large number of opinions, particularly criminal opinions, are issued pursuant to Circuit
Rule 35, which forbids the citation of such opinions as authority. Obviously, this article only
discusses published opinions.
3. This article will not include a discussion of decisions involving substantive issues of crim-
inal law.
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aspect of criminal proceedings.4 In the trilogy of United States v.
Wade,5 Gilbert v. California, 6 and Stovall v. Denno,7 the United States
Supreme Court articulated an outline of the sixth amendment guaran-
tee of the right to counsel in the context of eyewitness identification.
In Wade, the Supreme Court held that a post-indictment lineup is
a "critical" stage of the prosecution during which a defendant is enti-
tled, under the sixth amendment, to the assistance of counsel.8 In the
Gilbert case, the Court held that evidence of an identification of the
defendant made at a post-indictment lineup in the absence of the de-
fendant's counsel was inadmissable without a voluntary and intelligent
waiver by the defendant.9 In Stovall, the Court stated that "a claimed
violation of due process in the conduct of a confrontation depends on
the totality of the circumstances surrounding it."10 However, there is
no sixth amendment right to counsel at a lineup held before the initia-
tion of adversary proceedings."
The Supreme Court stated in Neil v. Biggers12 that the "central
question . . . was whether under the totality of the circumstances the
identification was reliable even though the confrontation procedure
was suggestive."' 3 And in the recent case of Manson v. Brathwaite,14
4. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). See generally Grano, Kirby, Biggers & Ash, Do Any Constitu-
tional Safeguards Remain Against the Danger of Convicting the Innocent? 72 MICH. L. REV. 717,
790-97 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Grano]; Pulaski, Neil v. Biggers:. The Supreme Court Dirmantles
the Wade Trilogy's Due Process Protection, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1097, 1113-19 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Pulaski]. See also Circuits Note: Criminal, 66 GEO. L.J. 201, 324-531 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as 1977 Circuits Note], for a thorough discussion of this subject.
5. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
6. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
7. 388 U.S. 293 (1967). Wade, Gilbert and Stovall were announced on the same day. See
generally 1977 Circuits Note, supra note 4, at 324-32.
8. 388 U.S. at 241. Due process standards also control the admission of identification made
in post-indictment stages that are not critical stages of the prosecution. United States v. Ash, 413
U.S. 300, 317, 320-21 (1973).
9. 388 U.S. at 273.
10. 388 U.S. at 302. The court ruled that despite the defendant's assertion that due process
was violated by an identification procedure which was unnecessarily suggestive, the totality of the
circumstances must be considered, and in this case, the necessity of holding the identification in a
hospital room superseded the defendant's claim to the usual police line-up. Id at 301-02.
11. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1972). Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 7-9
(1970).
12. 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
13. Id. at 198-99 (citing Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968)). The Biggers
Court enunciated five factors to be used to determine the reliability of the identification: the wit-
ness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the offense; his degree of attention during the
crime; the accuracy of his prior descriptions of the criminal; the level of certainty he exhibited at
the confrontation; and the length of time between the crime and confrontation. 409 U.S. at 199-
200. See also 1977 Circuits Note, supra note 4, at 324-31. See generally Grano and Pulaski, supra
note 4.
14. 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
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the Court concluded that the Biggers test also applied to post-Stovall
identification.' 5 The Manson Court explicitly rejected a per se exclu-
sionary rule which focuses on the procedures employed, and approved
an approach which considers the totality of circumstances.'
6
During the past year, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit decided two cases involving significant eyewitness
identification issues, Jones v. Wisconsin'7 and United States ex rel.
Moore v. Illinois.18 Jones arose from the habeas corpus petition of a
defendant who had pleaded guilty and had been convicted of armed
robbery. Jones had pleaded guilty after the admission of two in-court
identifications.' 9 The Seventh Circuit found that the district court had
properly assessed both in-court identifications in light of Neil v.
Biggers, and that one of the identifications had been tainted by im-
proper identification methods.20 The Jones court agreed with the dis-
trict court's conclusion that the fourth Biggers test-the certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation-was not met by the
first witness, who had had numerous opportunities to observe and iden-
tify the defendant, but did not do so until after he had received fre-
quent improper suggestions to do so.2' The Jones court also upheld the
district court's conclusion that a second witness' identification was
properly admitted, since the witness promptly identified the defendant
each time he had an opportunity to view him.22 The case was reversed
15. Id. at 107.
16. Id at 114. The Manson majority concluded that the witness's ability to make an accurate
identification outweighed the suggestiveness of the identification. The Court cited with approval
Kirby v. Sturges, 510 F.2d 397, 403-04, 407 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1016 (1975), in which
the Seventh Circuit concluded that under Biggers post-Stovall identifications should be assessed
by using the totality of the circumstances. See Haddad, Criminal Procedure and Habeas Corpus,
52 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 294, 295 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Haddad]; Skinner, Criminal Procedure,
53 CHi.-KEINr L. REV. 310, 311-14 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Skinner].
17. 562 F.2d 440 (7th Cir. 1977).
18. 577 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1978).
19. 562 F.2d at 441.
20. Id. at 443-44. Originally the district court had denied Jones's petition on the ground that
he had waived his right to challenge the constitutional infirmities of his conviction by his guilty
plea. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that under Lefkowitz v.
Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975), Jones was entitled to the same remedies in a federal habeas corpus
action as exist in the state courts of Wisconsin. 562 F.2d at 441.
21. The first witness had observed the defendant accompanied by a police officer in a lineup
in which the defendant was the only black. In addition, the first witness observed the second
witness make a positive identification and overheard the police tell the defendant he had failed a
polygraph examination. The Jones court concluded that such hesitance could not be equated with
"a natural and proper reluctance to misidentify an innocent party." Id. at 442-43. The court also
discussed Israel v. Odom, 521 F.2d 1370 (7th Cir. 1975), in which the court had accepted the
reliability of a thoughtful witness who displays initial caution before making a commitment to a
definite identification.
22. 562 F.2d at 444-45.
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on other grounds.23
United States ex rel. Moore v. Illinois24 was considered by the Sev-
enth Circuit on remand from the United States Supreme Court.25 The
Supreme Court had reversed a Seventh Circuit judgment affirming a
district court's denial of habeas relief.26 The Supreme Court found that
the defendant's right to counsel had been violated by an identification
of the defendant made in the absence of counsel after the initiation of
adversary proceedings. The Court held that such identification wasper
se excludable 27 under Gilbert v. California.28 The case was remanded
to the Seventh Circuit to determine whether the admission of the in-
court identification was harmless error.29 The Seventh Circuit decided
that the resolution of that issue depended on two separate inquiries: (1)
whether the identification was reliable even though the pretrial con-
frontation was suggestive; and (2) whether the in-court identification
was independent of the uncounseled pretrial confrontation. 30 The Sev-
enth Circuit then found the identification to be both reliable and based
on a source independent of the suggestive pretrial identification. 3' The
court based its finding on the "totality" of the circumstances, but em-
phasized the "moral certitude" of the victim witness.
32
ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
The principles of the fourth amendment protections against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures are well settled and will not be detailed
here.33 The United States Supreme Court underscored those principles
in Katz v. United States34 and Mapp v. Ohio35 when it held that, under
the fourth amendment, an individual's reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in his person and property is protected from unreasonable govern-
23. The court held that under Wisconsin law Jones's guilty plea must be vacated because one
witness's identification was improperly admitted. Id at 445-46.
24. 577 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1978).
25. Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977).
26. 534 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1976).
27. 434 U.S. at 231.
28. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
29. 434 U.S. at 232.
30. 577 F.2d at 412-13. The opinion also discusses whether the failure to provide the defend-
ant with a transcript of the preliminary hearing constituted prejudicial error.
31. Id. at 413.
32. Id at 415-16.
33. See generally LaFave, Search and Sei2ure: "The Course of True Law... Has Not...
Run Smooth," 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 255; 1977 Circuits Note, supra note 4, at 247-98; Skinner, supra
note 16, at 323-31; Haddad, supra note 16, at 298-301.
34. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
35. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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mental intrusions.36  In United States v. Chadwick,37 the Supreme
Court reaffirmed the principle that exceptions to the fourth amend-
ment's requirement that warrants issue only upon a showing of proba-
ble cause are to be strictly construed. 38 And in United States v.
Watson,39 the Court stated that the fourth amendment had long been
interpreted to "reflect the ancient common law rule that a peace officer
was permitted to arrest without a warrant. . . if there was reasonable
grounds for making the arrest." 4
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit dealt
with an arrest issue during this past year in United States v. Fernandez-
Guzman.41 In that case the court held that an examination of the suffi-
ciency of probable cause to arrest was not limited to the four corners of
a Rule 5(a)4 2 complaint filed subsequent-to an arrest.43 The Fernandez-
Guzman court found that the complaint in that case failed, on its face,
to show probable cause to arrest.44 The court concluded that the dis-
trict court did not err in conducting an evidentiary hearing on the prob-
able cause which went beyond the Rule 5(a) complaint. 45
In the area of searches, the Seventh Circuit encountered a number
of intriguing issues. In United States v. Mendel,46 the district court had
suppressed evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant that incorpo-
rated a tape recording of an agent's sworn statement before a magis-
trate. The search warrant detailed the place to be searched, but instead
of containing a written statement of the facts establishing probable
cause, the warrant merely referred to the tape recording. 47 The record-
ing had been made by the agent, under oath and in the presence of the
magistrate, and contained the magistrate's questions and the agent's
36. 389 U.S. at 353; 367 U.S. at 660. See 1977 Circuits Note, supra note 4, at 247.
37. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
38. Id. at 9.
39. 423 U.S. 411 (1976). See generally Note, Watson & Santanir Death Knellfor Arrest
Warrants? 28 SYRACUSE L. REv. 787 (1977).
40. 423 U.S. at 418. See also Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113 (1975).
41. 577 F.2d 1093 (7th Cir. 1978). The Seventh Circuit decided several other cases related to
probable cause, which merely restated prior law. See, e.g., United States v. Holleman, 575 F.2d
139 (7th Cir. 1978); Meiners v. Moriarty, 563 F.2d 343 (7th Cir. 1977).
42. Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(a) provides, in relevant part:
An officer making an arrest under a warrant issued upon a complaint or any person
making an arrest without a warrant shall take the arrested person without unnecessary
delay before the nearest available federal magistrate or, in the event that a federal magis-
trate is not reasonably available, before a state or local judicial officer authorized by 18
U.S.C. § 3041.
43. 577 F.2d at 1096.
44. Id
45. Id at 1100.
46. 578 F.2d 668 (7th Cir. 1978).
47. Id at 669.
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answers.48 The district court suppressed the fruits of the search because
the sworn statement was not set out in the affidavit pursuant to Rule
41(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 49 The Seventh Cir-
cuit reversed, holding that the district court's ruling was unduly nar-
row, and commenting that the 1972 amendment to Rule 41(c)
"evidences an intention that a recorded sworn oral statement by the
affiant made in the presence of the magistrate should be considered
part of the affidavit."' 50 The Mendel court pointed out that the law gen-
erally prefers spontaneous oral testimony to written affidavit.5' The
court also noted with approval the fact that oral presentation made it
possible for the magistrate to explore incomplete or ambiguous points
in the written affidavit.
52
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals also dealt with numerous
warrantless search cases. For example, in United States v.
Richardson,53 the court upheld the consent search of a closet which
uncovered clothing worn in a bank robbery. The closet was in an
apartment jointly occupied by the defendant and another individual.
Richardson argued that his co-tenant's consent to the search was inef-
fective, because the closet was exclusively used by Richardson. But the
Seventh Circuit held that Richardson assumed the risk that his co-ten-
ant would allow someone to search a closet which was part of their
jointly occupied bedroom.
54
In United States v. Simmons,55 the court of appeals considered the
search incident to arrest doctrine as it applied to the companions of
arrested defendants. Following a bank robbery by two armed men, the
authorities arrested co-defendant Pastore, who implicated Simmons
and offered information which led the police and the FBI to Simmons'
hotel. Upon arriving at the hotel, the FBI and police proceeded to
Simmons' room without a warrant. When the defendant opened the
door, he was immediately arrested and removed from the room. Si-
multaneously, two officers entered the small room and observed a na-
ked woman standing near the bed. One officer reached for something
to cover the woman. The other officer noticed a bulge on the bed
48. Id
49. Id at 670. Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(c) provides in relevant part:
A warrant shall issue only on an affidavit or affidavits sworn to before the federal
magistrate or state judge and establishing the grounds for issuing the warrant.
50. Id. at 670-71.
51. Id. at 672.
52. Id.
53. 562 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978).
54. Id. at 479-80.
55. 567 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1977).
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which he discovered was a bag containing United States currency. The
second officer observed a purse within the reach of the woman; he emp-
tied its contents onto the bed, and discovered a replica of a gun.
6
At his trial, Simmons argued that while there was probable cause
to arrest him, there was no probable cause to search the bed. The
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the search, citing
United States v. Berryhi157 in support. The court rejected the govern-
ment's contention that the rationale of Terry v. Ohio,58 which allows
limited intrusions of one's privacy by an officer, applied to searches of
the area within the arrestee's companion's control. However, the Sev-
enth Circuit found the search of the companion's immediate area rea-
sonable in light of the officer's belief that a dangerous situation might
have existed. 59 The Simmons court was careful to note that it was ad-
vocating neither an extension of Terry, nor wholesale searches of areas
within the immediate control of all persons present during an arrest.6°
Rather, the court was approving such searches "when an objective
probability of danger exists under the circumstances."
'6 l
In dissent, Judge Swygert, citing Chimel v. California62 and United
States v. Chadwick,63 suggested that the warrantless search was not rea-
sonable under the circumstances. Judge Swygert pointed out that the
defendant had been taken from the room, leaving several officers and a
nude woman.64 Under those circumstances, Judge Swygert argued,
there existed no clear and present danger to the officers that justified
the search.
65
56. Id at 316.
57. 445 F.2d 1189, 1192-93 (9th Cir. 1971). In Berryhill, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit held that officers, acting pursuant to a valid search warrant, who arrested the
defendant in an automobile, were constitutionally permitted to conduct a limited search of the
occupants of the automobile for the officers' own protection.
58. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The United States Supreme Court held in Terry that an officer who is
justified in believing that an individual is armed and potentially dangerous may make a limited
intrusion of that person's privacy in order to neutralize any threat of physical harm.
59. 567 F.2d at 318-19.
60. Id at 320.
61. Id
62. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). In Chimel, the United States Supreme Court held that a search of an
individual's entire house exceeded the limits of a search incident to an arrest, and was unnecessary
for the protection of the officers' safety. Accordingly, the Court held that the search violated the
fourth amendment, and consequently reversed the defendant's conviction, which was based on the
fruits of that search.
63. 433 U.S. 1 (1977). The Chadwick Court held that a search, without a valid search war-
rant, of a double-locked footlocker almost two hours after the defendant's arrest was unreasona-
ble, and the evidentiary fruits therefrom were inadmissible at the defendant's trial. The Court
found none of the exigent circumstances present which would authorize such a search, since the
officers were not fearful for their safety, nor was there a possibility that the evidence would be lost.
64. 567 F.2d at 322.
65. Id
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In United States v. Berry,66 the Seventh Circuit also had occasion
to consider the impact of United States v. Chadwick,67 in which the
United States Supreme Court held that a warrantless search of a foot-
locker at the time of arrest violated the fourth amendment. The
Chadwick Court distinguished the warrantless searches that had been
upheld in United States v. Robinson68 and United States v. Edwards.
69
The Seventh Circuit interpreted the Chadwick decision to allow
searches of arrestee's clothing and pockets as searches of the person,
because such searches, as opposed to that of a footlocker, do not in-
volve any greater reduction in the arrestee's expectation of privacy than
that caused by the arrest itself.
70
Berry involved the search of an attache case following the arrest
and handcuffing of a suspected bank robber.7' The district court de-
nied the defendant's motion to suppress the search. The Berry case was
briefed and argued before the Seventh Circuit prior to the issuance of
the Chadwick decision.72 The court of appeals, citing Chadwick, re-
versed the district court's denial of the motion to suppress. 73 Judge
Bauer, writing for the court, found the arrestee's privacy interest in the
attache case to be as great as the privacy interest which the Supreme
Court found that Chadwick had in the footlocker.74 The Berry court
distinguished the attache search from the search of a purse, concluding
that the attache search could not be justified as a search incident to
arrest because there was no danger that the arrestee would gain access
to the case in order to seize a weapon or destroy evidence.
75
Upon rehearing, the Seventh Circuit decided that the exclusionary
rule should not be applied to pre-Chadwick searches.76 In light of the
fact that various pre-Chadwick decisions had upheld warrantless
searches of briefcases or packages seized from arrestees after they had
been taken into custody, the panel could not say that law enforcement
officials were properly charged with the knowledge that the search of
the attache case was unconstitutional. 77 Thus, the court declined to ap-
66. 560 F.2d 861 (7th Cir. 1977), vacated, 571 F.2d 2 (7th Cir. 1978).
67. 433 U.S. 1 (1977). See general, 6 AM. J. CRIM. L. 81 (1978).
68. 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (search of arrestee's pockets).
69. 415 U.S. 800 (1974) (search of arrestee's clothing).
70. 560 F.2d at 863-64.
71. Id at 862-63.
72. Id
73. Id at 864-65.
74. Id at 864.
75. Id
76. 571 F.2d 2 (7th Cir. 1978).
77. Id at 3.
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ply Chadwick retroactively and vacated its earlier reversal.78
In one of its more intriguing search and seizure decisions, United
States v. Shelby,79 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ad-
dressed the issue of an individual's reasonable expectations of privacy
in trash.80 The defendant was a former employee of a janitorial com-
pany that serviced a number of banks. The defendant had obtained a
set of keys, which he used to enter various banks after hours and steal
coins. After the defendant had deposited large numbers of coins at an-
other bank, the FBI requested the local sanitation department to watch
for coin wrappers and trays in the trash outside Shelby's residence.
The sanitation workers removed Shelby's trash bins from his property
in the normal course of trash collection and dumped them into a truck.
Several blocks away, the workers examined the contents of the large
plastic bags that had been in Shelby's trash cans and discovered coin
wrappers and trays. These findings led to the issuance of a search war-
rant.8
On appeal of his conviction, Shelby argued that he had a reason-
able expectation of privacy in his trash, since he contemplated that the
trash would be collected and ultimately destroyed. Judge Wood called
this expectation "totally unrealistic, unreasonable, and in complete dis-
regard of the mechanics of its disposal. '8 2 The court went on to explic-
itly reject the "selective abandonment" rationale expressed by the
California Supreme Court in the celebrated case of People v. Krivda.
8 3
In so doing, the Seventh Circuit followed the position taken by the ma-
jority of federal courts.8
STATEMENTS, ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS
The fifth amendment provides that "no person.., shall be com-
78. Id.
79. 573 F.2d 971 (7th Cir. 1978).
80. See generally 1977 Circuits Note, supra note 4, at 247 n. 1.
81. 573 F.2d at 972-73.
82. Id at 973.
83. 5 Cal. 3d 359, 369, 486 P.2d 1262, 1269, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62, 70 (1971), vacated, 409 U.S. 33
(1972), reaff'd, 8 Cal. 3d 623, 504 P.2d 457, 105 Cal. Rptr. 521, cert. denied, 412 U.S. 919 (1973).
The Krivda court upheld the lower court's suppression of evidence obtained from the defendant's
garbage cans. The court held that the mere placement of a person's trash barrels on a public
sidewalk is not abandonment thereof. The court then held that these defendants, by their actions,
retained an expectation of privacy and that this expectation was reasonable under the circum-
stances.
84. See United States v. Mustone, 469 F.2d 970 (1st Cir. 1972) (no privacy in contents of
trash bags placed several doors away from his office); United States v. Stroble, 431 F.2d 1273 (6th
Cir. 1970) (empty carton and attached card lying beside two garbage cans near curb were not
protected by fourth amendment). Contra, Work v. United States, 243 F.2d 660 (D.C. Cir. 1957)
(seizure of phial from closed trash can under porch invalidated).
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pelled to be a witness against himself. '85 In Miranda v. Arizona,86 the
United States Supreme Court held that statements made during custo-
dial interrogations were inadmissible unless law enforcement officials
followed procedures which assured that the defendant was accorded his
privilege against self-incrimination.87 The Miranda procedures apply
to all custodial interrogations. 88
In White v. Finkbeiner,89 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit considered the issue of voluntariness in light of alleged violations
of Miranda. White was convicted in state court of murder, largely on
the basis of his confession and testimony regarding his reenactment of
the crime following his confession. White's motion to suppress his con-
fession was denied. White appealed to the Appellate Court of Illinois,
which remanded for a full evidentiary hearing.
At the hearing, the interrogating officer testified that White had
been advised of his Miranda rights orally and had waived those rights
in writing. However, there was also unequivocal testimony by the
watch commander to whom White had first been brought following his
arrest, that White had requested an attorney. White was questioned a
number of times; he finally confessed on the third day after his initial
arrest.9° The trial court again found that the defendant had been prop-
erly admonished.
On direct appeal, a majority of the Illinois appellate court con-
cluded that, since White had failed to offer any evidence to contradict
the final testimony, in fact he had not asked for an attorney. Thus, the
appellate court viewed the issue to be whether a defendant who mani-
fested an initial unwillingness to talk could be interrogated later after
being readvised of his rights.
One justice of the appellate court dissented, arguing that the rec-
ord demonstrated that White had asked for counsel, and, therefore, all
85. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See generally 1977 Circuits Note, supra note 4, at 333-51.
86. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
87. Those procedures include the following: (1) The defendant must be informed in clear
and unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent. Id at 467-68. (2) The warning of
the right to remain silent must be accompanied by the explanation that anything said can and will
be held against the individual in court. Id at 469. (3) The individual must be told that he has the
right to consult with counsel and have counsel present during the questioning. Id at 469-70. (4)
The individual must be told that if he cannot afford counsel, one will be appointed for him. Id at
473. (5) If the individual expresses a desire to end the interrogation, it must end immediately. Id
at 474. (6) If the individual states that he wishes an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an
attorney is present. Id at 474.
88. Id at 477-78.
89. 570 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1978).
90. Id at 196-98.
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subsequent statements were inadmissible under Miranda.9 ' On appeal,
the Illinois Supreme Court adopted the view of the dissenting appellate
court justice, concluding that White had requested a lawyer.92 The
state supreme court ruled, however, that the effect of the Miranda vio-
lations was so dissipated by lapse of time, repeated admonitions and
other intervening agents, that the defendant's confession was volun-
tary.
93
White then sought federal habeas corpus relief, but his petition
was denied by the district court without an evidentiary hearing. On
appeal from that decision, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
ruled that the district court had erred in denying White's habeas peti-
tion without a hearing.94 The Seventh Circuit said that an evidentiary
hearing was required where the trial court had failed to decide the cru-
cial issue of whether White indeed had asked for a lawyer when he was
first brought to the police station.95 Thus, the Seventh Circuit was un-
able to determine the basis for the state court's finding of voluntariness.
The Seventh Circuit court did indicate that even if a violation of
Miranda had occurred, it was not certain that the subsequent state-
ments would automatically fall.96 The White court left open the possi-
bility that the state could meet the "heavy burden" 97 of showing that
White at a later time had waived his rights to counsel. However, the
court was unwilling to decide whether the reasoning of Stone v.
Powell98 prevented the court from granting habeas relief for an alleged
Miranda violation which had been fully and fairly litigated in state
courts.
9 9
In United States ex rel Henne v. Fiske, °0 the Seventh Circuit re-
cently had occasion to consider the effect of another United States
Supreme Court decision limiting federal habeas relief for state prison-
91. People v. White, 22 Ill. App. 3d 180, 187, 317 N.E.2d 323, 328 (1974), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 970 (1976).
92. People v. White, 61 Il. 2d 288, 293-94, 335 N.E.2d 457, 461 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
970 (1976).
93. 61 Il. 2d at 297, 335 N.E.2d at 463.
94. 570 F.2d at 199.
95. Id at 200.
96. Id at 200-01.
97. Id at 202.
98. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). Where the state has provided an opportunity for full and fair litiga-
tion of a fourth amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief
on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at
his trial. Id at 494. See generally Note, Stone v. Powell: The End of Collateral Reviewfor Fourth
Amendment Claims by State Prisoners? 13 CAL. W.L. REv. 558 (1977).
99. 570 F.2d at 201.
100. 563 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978). The court's opinion in
Henne was originally issued on August 2, 1977 as an unpublished order pursuant to Local Circuit
Rule 35. The court later decided to publish the order.
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ers, Wainwright v. Sykes.' 0 In Wainwright, the Supreme Court had
held that where, under state law, a defendant was required to challenge
the admissibility of his confession at trial or not at all, review of the
issue on federal habeas corpus petition was barred "absent a showing
of 'cause' and 'prejudice,' attendant to [the] state procedural waiver."
1 02
In Henne, the defendant was tried and convicted in state court of
murder, following the admission of Henne's confession. Henne had
been arrested for driving while intoxicated and was advised of his
Miranda rights at that time. Henne was questioned the next morning
and was merely asked if he knew his rights. Henne responded affirma-
tively and then made a number of incriminating statements. At trial,
Henne moved to suppress his pretrial statements because allegedly he
did not understand his Miranda rights. 103 After an evidentiary hearing,
the trial court denied the motion. On. direct appeal, the Appellate
Court of Illinois considered the merits of Henne's Miranda claim and
affirmed the conviction. 04 After concluding that Henne, unlike Sykes,
had pressed the Miranda issue at trial and on direct appeal, the Seventh
Circuit held that Wainwright v. Sykes did not bar Henne's federal
habeas corpus petition.
10 5
The Henne court next considered the "potentially far reaching is-
sue"' 6 of whether the Supreme Court's holding in Stone v. Powell'
0 7
applied to fifth amendment claims. In Stone, the Supreme Court held
that "where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair liti-
gation of a Fourth Amendment claim, the Constitution does not re-
quire that a state prisoner be granted federal habeas corpus relief on
the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or
seizure was introduced at trial."' 08 Noting that in Wainwright v. Sykes
the Supreme Court declined to consider whether Stone should be ex-
tended to claimed Miranda violations which had been litigated in the
state court,'0 9 the Seventh Circuit concluded that it would not extend
Stone v. Powell to exclude federal habeas corpus consideration of fifth
amendment claims." 0 Addressing the merits of Henne's claim, the
Seventh Circuit held that the district court's finding that Henne under-
101. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
102. Id at 87.
103. 563 F.2d at 811.
104. People v. Henne, 23 Il. App. 3d 567, 319 N.E.2d 596 (1975).
105. 563 F.2d at 812.
106. Id
107. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). See note 98 supra.
108. Id at 482.
109. 563 F.2d at 812.
110. Id
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stood his rights and voluntarily waived these rights the next morning
was not clearly erroneous, and therefore affirmed the lower court's de-
nial of habeas relief."'
United States ex rel Cooper v. Warden" 2 also involved a state de-
fendant's habeas attack on his state conviction for murder, robbery and
burglary, based on his alleged mental incompetency to comprehend
Miranda warnings."13 Cooper had moved to suppress his confession
before the state court because of his alleged mental incompetency." 4
The trial court denied the motion to suppress and the state appellate
court affirmed on direct appeal. "15 The Seventh Circuit agreed with the
district court's finding that in light of the substantial record rebutting
Cooper's claim it had no alternative but to defer to the state court's
determination that Cooper understood his rights." 16
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968"17 provides a comprehensive plan regulating any electronic sur-
veillance by any law enforcement agency of oral or wire communica-
tions. The Act sets forth precisely detailed requirements for applying
for authorization to make an interception." 8 Any interceptions made
in violation of the statute are inadmissible in any criminal proceeding,
state or federal."19 Upon expiration of time covered by the application,
the law enforcement agency using the authorization must seal 20 the
tapes and authorizing orders "immediately."' 12'
In United States v. Angelini,122 the Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit considered the effect of delays in sealing authorized tapes.
In Angelini, three distinct authorizations were obtained. After termina-
tion of the recording, duplicate tapes were made and the originals were
retained in secure storage. Delays in sealing occurred when the volu-
minous tapes were transcribed, because the typists frequently found it
necessary to refer to the original tapes in order to prepare the tran-
111. The district court had viewed a video tape of Henne being questioned. Id at 814.
112. 566 F.2d 28 (7th Cir. 1977).
113. Id at 29.
114. Id
115. People v. Cooper, 30 Ill. App. 3d 326, 332 N.E.2d 453, cert. denied, 425 U.S. 994 (1976).
116. 566 F.2d at 30.
117. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976). See also 1977 Circuits Note, supra note 4, at 299; 57
B.U.L. Rev. 587 (1977) (forcible entry to business premises to install court ordered wiretap).
118. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516, 2518 (1976).
119. Id § 2575. See generally Skinner, supra note 16, at 331-39.
120. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a).
121. Id
122. 565 F.2d 469 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923 (1978).
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script. 12 3 The original tapes were sealed between nine and thirty-eight
days after the end of the wiretaps. 24 At the district court suppression
hearing, the district judge found no tampering with the tapes, and con-
cluded that the government had acted in the best of faith and with no
intent to circumvent the law.1 25 However, the court suppressed the
tapes because the government did not meet the statutory requirement
of a "satisfactory" explanation, ie., that a sealing delay was "really
necessary."1
26
In reversing the suppression order, the Seventh Circuit interpreted
United States v. Lawson, 27 in which the court, after careful examina-
tion, 2 8 held that suppression was inappropriate for violation of various
Title III procedures. As the Angelini court stated, 2 9 Lawson contem-
plates a two-step analysis. First, the district court must determine
whether a satisfactory explanation has been offered for a delay. Sec-
ond, if no satisfactory explanation has been offered, the district court
must decide if the purpose for which the particular procedure was
designed has been achieved despite the error.' 30 In addition, the
Angelini court held that the trial court must consider whether the statu-
tory requirement was deliberately ignored.'
3'
The Angelini court found that the government did offer a satisfac-
tory explanation for the sealing delay, although it suggested alternative
measures which might avoid such delay in the future. 132 The court also
found no deliberate avoidance of the statutory requirements.
33
Angelini clearly demonstrated the Seventh Circuit's commitment
to examining congressional purposes behind the various procedures
specified in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. The
court explicitly refused 134 to follow the Second Circuit's position in
United States v. Gigante, 35 which held that a delay in sealing requires
suppression without inquiry into the satisfaction of congressional pur-
poses, absent a satisfactory explanation.
123. Id
124. Id at 470-71.
125. Id at 471.
126. Id
127. 545 F.2d 557 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 927 (1976).
128. Id at 562-65.
129. 565 F.2d at 471.
130. Id at 471.
131. Id
132. Id at 472.
133. Id
134. Id at 472 n.7. The Seventh Circuit has also discussed wiretapping issues arising from
grand jury proceedings in In re Lopez, 565 F.2d 407 (7th Cir. 1977), and In re Pavone, 570 F.2d
674 (7th Cir. 1978). See text accompanying notes 176-192 infra.
135. 538 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1976).
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RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Applicability of Right to Counsel
The United States Supreme Court recently restated the sixth
amendment 36 guarantee of the right to counsel after the initiation of
adversary criminal proceedings in Brewer v. Williams. 137 The Brewer
Court relied heavily on Massiah v. United States, 38 in which the Court
held that admissions by the defendant to a government informant were
inadmissible because the admissions were made after indictment in the
absence of counsel. 39 The Massiah Court viewed the post-indictment
statement to a government informant as analogous to an interrogation
by government agents.14°
In United States v. Craig, 14' the Seventh Circuit considered the
right to counsel issue in the context of taped conversations. In Craig,
members of the Illinois General Assembly were prosecuted for conspir-
acy and mail fraud resulting from bribes they had accepted to vote for
legislation favorable to the cement industry. During the pre-indictment
investigation, one of the legislators agreed to cooperate with the gov-
ernment and record his conversations with another implicated legisla-
tor. The defendant legislator whose conversations were taped
ultimately was convicted. 42 On appeal, he argued that his sixth
amendment rights to counsel had been violated because the govern-
ment knew he had retained counsel.' 43 The Seventh Circuit rejected
the defendant's argument because, unlike in Massiah, no criminal pro-
ceedings had yet been initiated against the defendant. 44
Effective Assistance of Counsel
In United States ex rel William v. Twomey, 145 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit held that the standard for effective assist-
ance of counsel required by the sixth amendment was whether defense
counsel had met "a minimum standard of professional representa-
136. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides, in pertinent part:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right. to have the Assist-
ance of Counsel for his defense.
137. 430 U.S. 387 (1977). See also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972); Kirby v.
Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972). For a discussion of Brewer, see Kamisar, Foreword- Brewer v.
Williams -A Hard Look at a Discomfiting Record, 66 GEo. L.J. 209 (1977).
138. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
139. Id at 205-06.
140. Id at 206.
141. 573 F.2d 455 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3221 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1978).
142. Id at 462, 473.
143. Id at 473.
144. Id at 475.
145. 510 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1975).
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tion." 46 That standard was reiterated this term in United States ex rel
Rooney v. Housewright. 14
7
United States ex re. Smith v. Pavich 148 presented the Seventh Cir-
cuit with the provocative issue of whether a defendant who chose to
represent himself could thereafter complain that the quality of his own
defense amounted to a denial of effective assistance of counsel. The
court of appeals concluded that the Supreme Court explicitly held in
Faretta v. California14 9 that a defendant who makes a competent and
knowing waiver of his right to professional counsel and chooses to rep-
resent himself cannot thereafter complain that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel.
The Seventh Circuit considered whether the sixth amendment per-
mitted a defendant to choose as his counsel a person unlicensed to
practice law in United States v. Taylor.1 50 The court concluded that
neither the historical background of the sixth amendment nor the
Supreme Court's decision in Faretta guaranteed a defendant a right to
be represented by an unlicensed person. The Taylor court also con-
cluded that the district court committed no error in appointing standby
counsel for the defendant over the defendant's objections.
In United States v. Gaines,15 a case decided in a prior term, the
Seventh Circuit held that the sixth amendment guarantee of assistance
of counsel includes the right to counsel "whose loyalties are not divided
between clients with conflicting interests."' 52 Last term, in United
States v. Kidding, 153 the court of appeals held that primary responsibil-
ity for avoidance of a professional conflict of interest rests with the at-
torneys and not with the court.I 4
In another case decided this term, United States ex rel McClindon
v. Warden, 55 a state defendant who had been convicted of murder
brought a federal habeas corpus petition alleging that his sixth amend-
ment right to counsel had been violated because of the divided loyalties
of his counsel. McClindon and his co-defendant Hubbard were tried
jointly for the murder of one Leon Hunt. Testimony at the state trial
146. Id at 641.
147. 568 F.2d 516, 520 (7th Cir. 1977).
148. 568 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1978).
149. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
150. No. 77-1180 (7th Cir. June 12, 1978).
151. 529 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1976). See also Note, United States Y. Gaines, 53 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 545 (1978).
152. Id at 1043.
153. 560 F.2d 1303 (7th Cir. 1977).
154. Id at 1310 (citing United States v. MandelL 525 F.2d 671 (7th Cit. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1049 (1976)).
155. 575 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1978).
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established that both McClindon and Hubbard were observed entering
an apartment bathroom and were heard to be arguing with the victim
Hunt. Gunshots were fired and both McClindon and Hubbard were
observed fleeing the apartment. 56 The district court held that under
the facts adduced at trial, an attorney who met minimum standards of
professional representation would not have undertaken the joint de-
fense of McClindon and Hubbard. 57
The Seventh Circuit disagreed with the district court and reversed
and remanded for further evidentiary hearings.' 58  The McClindon
court relied on the defense counsel's testimony that McClindon, who
had retained the attorney, had steadily maintained that he and Hub-
bard had acted in concert. Trial counsel also testified that McClindon
had suggested that the attorney represent both defendants since both
defendants would "either walk together or go down together."' 59
The McClindon court's analysis reiterates the Seventh Circuit's
holding in United States v. Mandell 60 that common representation, ab-
sent evidence that conflict of interest actually exists, is not in itself a
violation of the sixth amendment.' 6 1 The court also emphasized the
Kidding principle that the primary responsibility for avoiding profes-
sional conflicts lies with the bar and not with the bench.'
62
In United States v. Shepard,63 the Seventh Circuit considered the
right to the appointment of two attorneys in capital cases as provided in
section 3005 of title 18 of the United States Code.' 64 Shepard, a pris-
oner in a federal penitentiary, was indicted for the murder of a fellow
prisoner, pursuant to section 1111 of title 18 of the United States
Code,165 which provided for the death penalty under circumstances
parallel to those provisions held unconsitutional in Furman v.
Georgia.'66 The Shepard court, disagreeing with the Fourth Circuit,
167
156. Id at 110-14.
157. Id
158. 575 F.2d at 116.
159. Id at 112-13.
160. 525 F.2d 671 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1049 (1976).
161. Id at 677.
162. 575 F.2d at 114.
163. 576 F.2d 719 (7th Cir. 1978).
164. 18 U.S.C. § 3005 (1976) provides, in pertinent part:
Whoever is indicted for treason or other capital crime shall be allowed to make his
full defense by counsel learned in the law, and the court before which he is tried, or some
judge thereof, shall immediately, upon his request assign to him such counsel, not ex-
ceeding two, as he may desire, who shall have free access to him at all reasonable hours.
165. 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (1976).
166. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
167. United States v. Watson, 496 F.2d 1125 (4th Cir. 1973). The Watson court reasoned that
it was impossible to determine that "the possibility of imposition of the death penalty was the sole
reason why Congress gave an accused the right to two attorneys." Id at 1128-29. Therefore, they
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held that since Furman had precluded the possibility of a death penalty
in Shepard, section 3005, which related to capital crimes, was inappli-




The United States Supreme Court has declared that the responsi-
bilities of the grand jury "include both the determination whether there
is probable cause to believe a crime has been committed and the pro-
tection of citizens against unfounded criminal prosecutions."' 169 The
grand jury's proceedings are secret and its investigative powers are
broad. 70 The Supreme Court has stated that "[i]ndispensable to the
exercise of [the grand jury's] power is the authority to compel the at-
tendance and the testimony of witnesses. . . and to require production
of evidence." 17 1 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently
decided three significant cases involving control of the grand jury proc-
ess: In Re Lopez, 72 In Re Pavone,173 and Wisconsin v. Schaffer.174 Two
of those decisions were directly related to Gelbard v. United States,17 5 in
which the Supreme Court held that a grand jury witness could refuse to
answer questions after being ordered to do so by a court if the testi-
mony sought was derived from illegal interceptions.
76
In In Re Lopez, 177 three federal grand jury witnesses were held in
civil contempt for refusing to take the grand jury oath and submit
handwriting exemplars, fingerprints or photos. The grand jury, which
had subpoenaed the three, was investigating terrorist bombings in the
Northern District of Illinois, responsibility for which was claimed by a
group calling itself the Fuerzas Armadas Liberacion Nacional Puertor-
riquena (FALN). Among other challenges, the appellants argued that
concluded it was not possible to hold that Furman effected a judicial repeal of § 3005, and held
that "notwithstanding Furman, defendant had an absolute statutory right to two attorneys under §
3005." Id
168. 576 F.2d at 729.
169. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974). See also United States v. Mandu-
jano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976); see generally 1977 Circuits Note, supra note 4, at 363-76.
170. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 571 (1976).
171. Id
172. 565 F.2d 407 (7th Cir. 1977).
173. 570 F.2d 674 (7th Cir. 1978).
174. 565 F.2d 961 (7th Cir. 1977).
175. 408 U.S. 41 (1972).
176. The Supreme Court did not decide if a grand jury witness could refuse to answer ques-
tions based on interceptions made pursuant to a court order. Neither did the Court consider
whether a grand jury witness could be entitled to a full blown suppression hearing testing the
legality of a court order authorizing an interception.
177. 565 F.2d 407 (7th Cir. 1977).
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the grand jury under-represented Latinos and that the subpoenas were
issued because of information obtained by unlawful wiretaps. 78 The
Seventh Circuit followed the appellants' assumption that the Gelbard
logic extended to refusal to take grand jury oaths and to submit to iden-
tification procedures, t e., if the investigation were based on illegal
wiretaps, the witnesses could refuse to take the grand jury oath or to
submit fingerprints. 79 The district court had accepted affidavits from
the government attorneys and agents stating that they had no personal
knowledge of any electronic surveillance. 80 Clearly, the agents and
prosecutors assigned to the case could not speak for the entire govern-
ment. Appellants argued that the district court should have ordered the
government to make a search of such proportions that affidavits could
be filed which unequivocally stated that no wiretapping had oc-
curred. 181 The Seventh Circuit upheld the district court finding that the
appellants fell far short of the requisite showing of specific facts dem-
onstrating illegal electronic surveillance and, therefore, no basis existed
for a more wide-ranging search.'
8 2
In In Re Pavone,8 3 the Seventh Circuit considered the scope of a
grant of immunity to an immunized witness. Pavone was subpoenaed
before a grand jury, but refused to answer questions, claiming a fifth
amendment privilege. Pavone was granted use immunity, but persisted
in his refusal to answer questions, and was held in contempt. 8 4 On
appeal, Pavone argued that the questions he was asked before the
grand jury were based on illegal electronic surveillance and, therefore,
his refusal to answer was justified. 8 5 Pavone argued that the district
court had improperly denied his request for full disclosure of materials
possessed by the government relating to authorization and execution of
electronic surveillance.
Pavone also challenged the manner in which the contempt hearing
was conducted by the district court. In that proceeding, the same judge
178. Id at 409.
179. Id at 413.
180. Id
181. Id
182. Id at 416. In holding that the government's denial of unlawful surveillance was ade-
quate, the Lopez court followed a line of recent federal appellate decisions which have held that
the requirements for the government's denial of electronic surveillance depend upon the specific-
ity of the allegation of illegality. See United States v. Vanagita, 552 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1977); In re
Millow, 529 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1976); In re Mintzer, 511 F.2d 471 (1st Cir. 1975); United States v.
Stevens, 510 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1975); In re Vigil, 524 F.2d 209 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 927 (1976); United States v. See, 505 F.2d 845 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992
(1975).
183. 570 F.2d 674 (7th Cir. 1978).
184. Id at 676.
185. Id
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who had authorized Title III electronic surveillance, also conducted an
in camera review of the petitions and authorization and found them to
be sufficient in fact and law. In addition, the district court found that
the grand jury questions originated from properly conducted author-
ized wiretaps.'
86
The Pavone court's decision turned on its interpretation of Gelbard
v. United States.187 The Pavone court did not read the Gelbard deci-
sion as mandating full discovery and evidentiary hearing whenever a
grand jury witness seeks protection under section 2515 of title 18 of the
United States Code.'8 8 Rather, the Seventh Circuit held that a proper
balancing of the functioning of the grand jury system and the federal
wiretap statute require no more than the in camera inspection per-
formed by the district court.'8 9 In so ruling, the Pavone court appeared
to follow Justice White's concurring opinion in Gelbard.190
The Pavone court also relied upon the Supreme Court's position in
United States v. Calandra,' 9' which held that a grand jury witness may
not refuse to answer questions on the ground that the questions re-
sulted from evidence obtained from a seizure which violated the fourth
amendment.' 92 The Seventh Circuit agreed with the Supreme Court
that suppression hearings would unduly prolong grand jury proceed-
ings. 193
In Wisconsin v. Schaffer,194 the appellant Kathleen Schaffer was
charged with murder by the State of Wisconsin. Schaffer caused the
Wisconsin trial court to issue a subpoena duces tecum to the United
States Attorney, requiring him to produce federal grand jury minutes
relating to the homicide for which Schaffer was charged. Schaffer
sought the grand jury minutes because the victim and chief state wit-
ness had been involved in narcotics trafficking.
The United States Attorney sought to quash the subpoena before
the state court. The court denied the motion and ordered the United
States Attorney to produce the grand jury minutes or show cause why
he should not be held in contempt. 95 The United States Attorney
promptly filed a removal petition in the federal district court. Al-
186. Id
187. 408 U.S. 41 (1972).
188. 570 F.2d at 678.
189. Id at 678-79.
190. See 408 U.S. at 70 (White, J., concurring).
191. 414 U.S. 338 (1974). Calandra was not a wire interception case.
192. Id at 353-55.
193. Id at 349-50.
194. 565 F.2d 961 (7th Cir. 1977).
195. Id at 962.
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though the underlying Wisconsin murder case was, of course, criminal,
the petition for removal characterized the action as civil, commenced
against an officer of the United States for an act under color of his
office. 1
96
During the course of the removal hearing, Schaffer filed a petition
pursuant to Rule (6)(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
seeking a district court order to release the testimony before the grand
jury involving the homicide. 97 The district court found that it had ju-
risdiction under section 1442 of title 28 of the United States Code to
consider the removed contempt matter, and vacated the state court or-
der for production of grand jury minutes and the rule to show cause. 1
98
The district court also denied Schaffer's Rule (6)(e) petition because it
failed to state a particularized need sufficient to "overbalance the
strong policy in favor of the secrecy of grand jury proceedings."' 199
Schaffer appealed both orders.
The Seventh Circuit found that the district court did have jurisdic-
tion to consider the contempt issue. Schaffer had argued that the order
to show cause against the United States Attorney did not constitute a
"civil action," or "criminal prosecution" within the meaning of section
1442(a) of title 18 of the United States Code.2° The court interpreted
the statute broadly, finding that the United States Attorney was placed
in jeopardy for his refusal to comply with a state order based on his
official duty.20 ' The Seventh Circuit agreed with the Fourth Circuit,
which stated in North Carolina v. Carr,20 2 "We think it unfruitful to
quibble over the label affixed to this contempt action. Regardless of
whether it is called civil, criminal or sui generis, it clearly falls within
the language and intent of the statute. ' 20 3 The Seventh Circuit con-
cluded that the contempt proceeding against the United States Attor-
ney was a sufficient separate charge and was validly removed without
also removing the murder case. 204
The Schaffer court, however, reversed the district court denial of
Schaffer's Rule (6)(e) petition for disclosure.20 5 The Schaffer court ex-
196. Id 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (1976) provides that a civil action commenced in state court against
any officer of the United States for an act committed under color of his office can be removed to
United States district courts.
197. 565 F.2d at 962.
198. Id
199. Id
200. Id at 963.
201. Id at 963-64.
202. 386 F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1967).
203. Id at 131.
204. 565 F.2d at 964 (citing United States v. Penny, 320 F. Supp. 1396, 1397 (D.D.C. 1970)).
205. Id at 965-67.
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panded the disclosure criterion of particularized need. The court found
that the district court had abused its discretion by not authorizing dis-
closure to the state trial judge, because (1) the federal grand jury had
completed its work and thus the reasons for secrecy became less com-
pelling; (2) the federal grand jury had investigated drug related inci-
dents relating directly to the credibility of the state's chief witness, who
had admitted killing the victim; (3) Schaffer was charged as an acces-
sory; (4) disclosure would only be made to the state trial judge until
evidence helpful to the defendant was found; and (5) the district court
failed to give due weight to considerations of federalism and comity.
20 6
The requirements for showing a particularized need for Rule (6)(e) dis-
closure, thus, were clarified by the Schaffer court.
INDICTMENT
In the past year, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit con-
sidered challenges to indictments in United States v. Pavloski20 7 and
United States v. Roya.20 8 In United States v. Roya, a physician was
convicted of dispensing Schedule II controlled substances in violation
of section 841(a)(1) of title 21 of the United States Code.2°9 Dr. Roya
dispensed prescriptions to large numbers of individuals without per-
forming any examinations of the individuals.210 The indictment
charged that Dr. Roya attempted to dispense controlled substances
"pursuant to prescriptions not written in the course of professional
practice."' 21 Dr. Roya argued that the indictment was vague since the
language "pursuant to a prescription not written in the course of pro-
fessional practice" was taken not from the criminal statute, but rather
from regulations for the professional practice of physicians. 212
The Roya court noted that the subject language tracked the lan-
guage of regulation.213 The court went on to note that in United States
v. Green214 the inclusion of that language did not improperly broaden
section 841 of title 21 of the United States Code in its applicability to a
206. Id at 967.
207. 574' F.2d 933 (7th Cir. 1978).
208. 574 F.2d 386 (7th Cir. 1978).
209. Id at 388-89. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976) provides:
Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person know-
ingly or intentionally to manufacture, distribute, or dispense or possess with intent to
manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance.
210. 574 F.2d at 389.
211. Id. at 390.
212. Id Dr. Roya was referring to 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a).
213. 574 F.2d at 390.
214. 511 F.2d 1062 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1031 (1975).
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medical practitioner. 215 In Green, the appellant had challenged the in-
clusion of reference to the regulation in the indictment. In Roya, the
appellant attacked the failure of the government to include a reference
in the indictment to the specific regulation. The Roya court rejected
the appellant's argument, holding that the disputed language was not
essential to a properly drawn indictment since the indictment need not
negate an exception to the statute. 216
Dr. Roya also challenged the indictment because it did not state in
each count the names of the individuals to whom he had allegedly dis-
pensed controlled substances. The Seventh Circuit held that the "test is
whether the indictment sets forth the elements of the offense charged
and sufficiently apprises the defendant of the charges to enable him to
prepare for trial. ' 21 7 Since each count set forth the time and place of
the defendant's conduct, the Roya court held that the test had been
satisfied.218
In United States v. Pavloski,21 9 the defendant was charged with
embezzling and converting union funds and making false statements in
a labor organization. Pavloski was the treasurer of a local union. Be-
tween 1972 and 1975, he cashed twenty-three checks drawn on the
union account and kept the proceeds. Pavloski forged the name of the
union president, and indorsed each check with his own name. The
bank did not detect the forgery and honored all checks. Under long
settled commercial law principles and the Uniform Commercial
Code,220 a drawee bank pays out of its own funds if it honors a forged
check. Applying this doctrine, Pavloski argued that he embezzled not
the union's funds, but the bank's funds.2
2'
The Seventh Circuit held that since Pavloski had converted the
blank checks of the union, that alone was enough to satisfy the stat-
ute.222 Moreover, because the bank did honor the checks, Pavloski did
convert union funds, even if such conversion was only temporary.223
Finally, the court noted it was unlikely that the union would be able to
recover its funds from the bank under commercial law principles be-
215. 574 F.2d at 390.
216. Id at 391. The Seventh Circuit also noted that in United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122,
124 (1975), the Supreme Court held that registered physicians can be prosecuted under 21 U.S.C.
§ 841 if their activities fall outside the usual course of professional conduct.
217. 574 F.2d at 391.
218. Id
219. 574 F.2d 933 (7th Cir. 1978).
220. U.C.C. § 3-418.
221. 574 F.2d at 935.
222. Id at 935-36.
223. Id
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cause of its delay in discovering the forgeries and reporting them to the
bank.
224
The Seventh Circuit's resolution of Pavloski's attack on the suffi-
ciency of his indictment is in keeping with rule 7(c)(1) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which requires that indictments be plain,
concise and definite written statements of the essential elements consti-
tuting the offense charged. This rule implements the constitutional re-
quirement of the sixth amendment that defendants have the right to be
informed of the nature and cause of accusation. In applying the notice
requirement, the Pavloski court applied a common sense reading of the
indictment.
In the same count, Pavloski also was charged with converting and
embezzling cash dues and union initiation fees. He argued that the
count was duplicitous, i e., that it charged two or more distinct and
separate offenses. 225 The Seventh Circuit discussed the purposes served
by the rule against duplicity, which include the prevention of (1)
double jeopardy, (2) prejudice with respect to evidentiary rulings dur-
ing trial, and (3) conviction by a verdict that is not unanimous. 226 The
Pavloski court held that only the last test was of any significance in the
case before it.227
Since Pavloski offered no instruction stating that the jurors must
agree on at least one act, the Seventh Circuit was not inclined to hold
that the general instruction on unanimity was insufficient. The court
also noted that Pavloski admitted committing all the acts alleged, and
merely denied that he possessed the requisite mental state. The court,
therefore, found no possibility of prejudice through lack of unanim-
ity.228
SEVERANCE
Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permits the
joinder of two or more offenses in an indictment or information if the
offenses are of the same or similar character or arise out of "a common
scheme or plan. ' 229 Multiple defendants may be charged in the same
indictment "if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or





229. FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(a) provides:
Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or information in a sepa-
rate count for each offense if the offenses charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors or
both, are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act or transaction or
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions constituting an
offense. '230 Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure pro-
vides for the severance of co-defendants when such relief is necessary
to protect the parties.231
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in accordance with
the majority of circuits, disfavors severance for co-defendants named in
a single indictment. 232 In United States v. Grabiec,233 United States v.
A/pern234 and United States v. Holleman, 35 the Seventh Circuit consid-
ered the standard for severance.
Grabiec involved a prosecution for extortion of money under color
of official rights of a former director of the Illinois Department of La-
bor and a former superintendent of the Division of Private Employ-
ment Agencies. On appeal, one defendant argued that he should have
been severed because the evidence of his co-defendant's guilt was
"overwhelming."2 36 The Grabiec court reiterated the well-settled prin-
ciple that the broad discretion of a trial judge in ruling on severance
motions will not be upset unless an abuse of discretion has been
shown. 237 A mere disparity in the evidence is insufficient. 238
In Holleman, one co-defendant argued that the admission of a co-
defendant's statement, which allegedly inculpated the appellant in vio-
lation of the rule in Bruton v. United Sates,239 so prejudiced him that
on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common
scheme or plan.
See generally 1977 Circuits Note, supra note 4, at 392-96.
230. FED. R. CRiM. P. 8(b) provides:
Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or information if they
are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same series of
acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses. Such defendants may be charged
in one or more counts together or separately and all of the defendants need not be
charged in each count.
231. FED. R. CRiM. P. 14 provides:
If it appears that a defendant or the government is prejudiced by a joinder of of-
fenses or of defendants in an indictment or information or by such joinder for trial to-
gether, the court may order an election or separate trials of counts, grant a severance of
defendants or provide whatever other relief justice requires. In ruling on a motion by a
defendant for severance the court may order the attorney for the government to deliver
to the court for inspection in camera any statements or confessions made by the defend-
ants which the government intends to introduce at the trial.
232. In United States v. Barrett, 505 F.2d 1091, 1106 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 964
(1975), the Seventh Circuit stated, "Reversal of a conviction ... for failure to sever an offense
under Rule 14 is almost non-existent." See Haddad, supra note 16, at 307; 1977 Circuits Note,
supra note 4, at 392-96.
233. 563 F.2d 313 (7th Cir. 1977).
234. 564 F.2d 755 (7th Cir. 1977).
235. 575 F.2d 139 (7th Cir. 1978).
236. 563 F.2d at 318.
237. Id
238. Id at 318-19.
239. 391 U.S. 123, 127-28 (1968). In Bruton, the Supreme Court held that admission of a co-
defendant's out-of-court statement inculpating the defendant violates the defendant's sixth
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the trial court abused its discretion by denying a severance. The Sev-
enth Circuit majority disagreed with the appellant, and held that
Bruton had not been violated, that severance need be granted only for
the most compelling reasons, and that appellant must demonstrate that
a fair trial cannot be had without a severance. 24° The court held that it
was insufficient to show that a separate trial offers a better chance for
acquittal.24'
In United States v. Alpern,242 the court examined the severance is-
sue in far greater detail. Alpern involved a trial of five defendants for
conspiracy to bomb a tavern. The defendants were engaged in inter-
state commerce and various substantive offenses committed in the
course of the conspiracy. One defendant, Mierlak, alleged that the trial
court abused its discretion by denying his motion for severance. 243 In
support of his position, Mierlak argued that (1) he was named in only
two of thirteen counts; (2) he was the only one of five co-defendants
who did not have a prior criminal record; (3) he was a former police-
man, and thus may have been found guilty simply because of his asso-
ciation with the four other co-defendants; (4) he was allegedly
prejudiced by testimony that a co-defendant attempted to orchestrate a
witness' testimony at trial; and (5) he was allegedly prejudiced by testi-
mony that the government's principal witness feared for his life, pre-
sumably because of threat from co-defendants. 244 The Alpern court
rejected Mierlak's contentions.
Citing United States v. Papia,245 the court held that Mierlak was
entitled to "separate trial only if it was not within the jury's capacity to
follow the court's limiting instructions to assess each defendant's guilt
or innocence solely on the basis of the evidence admissible against
him."246 Because the necessity for separate trials depends on the pecu-
liarities of particular cases, the district judges are accorded wide discre-
tion in ruling on motions for severance. The Alpern court held that
such rulings will not be overturned unless there is a clear showing of
abuse.24 7 The Seventh Circuit found no abuse of discretion, pointing
primarily to the fact that one of Mierlak's co-defendants was acquitted
amendment confrontation rights if the co-defendant who made the statement does not take the
stand. See 1977 Circuits Note, supra note 4, at 594.
240. 575 F.2d at 142.
241. Id
242. 564 F.2d 755 (7th Cir. 1977).
243. Id at 757.
244. Id at 758.
245. 560 F.2d 827 (7th Cir. 1977).
246. 564 F.2d at 758.
247. Id
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by the same jury. Thus, the Seventh Circuit refused "to assume that
the jury was so inflamed with passion and prejudice as to be unable to
separate the guilty from the innocent."
248
DISCOVERY AND DISCLOSURE
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued a number of
opinions this past term dealing with criminal discovery 249 and
prosecutorial disclosure mandated by Brady v. Maryland 
250
The Seventh Circuit considered the issue of newly discovered evi-
dence in United States v. Hedgeman.251 As in many newly discovered
evidence cases, an examination of the facts in Hedgeman is essential.
Hedgeman was an Area Management Broker for the Federal Housing
Authority. He was convicted of filing false claims and filing false state-
ments. Hedgeman also was indicted but not convicted of conspiracy.
252
One of the government's principal witnesses, Pearson, a contrac-
tor, testified he had paid kickbacks to Hedgeman. Through Pearson,
the government introduced Pearson's work sheets bearing notations of
amounts paid to Hedgeman. Pearson was rigorously cross-examined
concerning the work sheets and the fact that Pearson had engaged in
such illegal acts as destroying records to impede an Internal Revenue
Service investigation and using fictitious names on bids. Pearson also
was cross-examined concerning his agreement to testify for the govern-
ment, which protected him from prosecution.
The court interpreted the cross-examination to raise the inference
that Pearson had recently fabricated the notations. Pearson also testi-
fied that he had not requested that any examination be performed on
the document to determine its age.
Both the defense and the government contacted the same expert,
who told both parties that no tests could determine the age of ink.
About two and one half years after the trial, Hedgeman's defense coun-
sel learned that the expert had examined Pearson's work sheets and
248. Id
249. Criminal discovery on federal cases is regulated by FED. R. CRIM. P. 16. Generally the
scope of rule 16 discovery is within the discretion of the trial court. Hemphill v. United States, 392
F.2d 45 (8th Cir. 1968). But see United States v. Cook, 432 F.2d 1093 (7th Cir. 1970).
250. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
251. 564 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1070 (1978).
252. Hedgeman's duties required him to solicit bids, make contracts and process claims for
services in connection with the rehabilitation of properties which had been acquired by forfeiture.
The testimony at trial clearly established that Hedgeman signed and passed on forms for work
which had not been performed; that he passed on bids in the names of persons who were not bona
fide contractors; and that he filled out and passed on bids that otherwise were not bona fide bids.
Id at 764.
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concluded that someone had performed tests for ink. The defense
moved for a new trial, arguing that this constituted newly discovered
evidence.
253
The district court, in ruling on Hedgeman's post trial motion, had
assumed that the evidence would have impeached Pearson and was de-
liberately withheld.254 Nevertheless, the court denied Hedgeman's mo-
tion for a new trial. Citing United States v. Agurs,255 the court held that
Hedgeman's conviction must be set aside "if there is any reasonable
likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of
the jury. ' 256 The trial court found that Pearson's testimony related to
conspiracy charges, of which Hedgeman was acquitted, and thus, the
evidence could not have affected the jury's verdict.
257
The Seventh Circuit concluded that Hedgeman's central claim was
that Pearson had lied by stating that no tests were conducted pursuant
to his request, in order to determine the age of the ink. The subsequent
testimony of the expert did not establish whether such a test was made
to determine the age of the ink. In fact, no such determination could be
made.25
8
The court of appeals held that Hedgeman's motion had been prop-
erly denied, although it expressed doubt about the propriety of the dis-
trict court's assumptions. The court of appeals concluded that the
defense had not exercised due diligence in seeking the subject evi-
dence. 2
59
The Hedgeman court also appeared to reaffirm the traditional test
for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. 26° The court fur-
ther noted that when new evidence challenges the constitutional valid-
ity of a conviction, the traditional test diminishes in importance.
261
The Seventh Circuit noted with approval that two other circuits had
253. Id at 765.
254. Id at 766.
255. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
256. Id at 103.
257. 564 F.2d at 766.
258. Id at 767.
259. Id at 768-69.
260. Id at 768. The Seventh Circuit cited United States v. Curran, 465 F.2d 260, 264 (7th Cir.
1972), for the standard.
1st. That the evidence has come to his knowledge since the trial. 2d. That it was not
owin to want of due diligence that it did not come sooner. 3d. That it is so material
that it would probably produce a different verdict, if the new trial were ranted. 4th.
That it is not cumulative only-viz.: speaking to facts, in relation to which there was
evidence on the trial. 5th. That the affidavit of the witness himself should be produced,
or its absence accounted for. And 6th, a new trial will not be granted, if the only object
of the testimony is to impeach the character or credit of a witness.
564 F.2d at 768 n.2.
261. Id at 768 (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 111 (1976)).
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applied a due diligence test, even in cases which raised constitutional
issues.262 The court concluded by stating that it found little reason to
say Hedgeman's trial was unfair.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit dealt with the issue
of alleged violations of the government's duty to disclose evidence
favorable to the defendant in United States v. Mackey26 3 and United
States v. Weidman.264 Under Brady v. Maryland, the well-known
United States Supreme Court case regarding the duty to disclose, sup-
pression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the defendant vio-
lates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or
punishment. 265 In United States v. AgUrs, 266 the Supreme Court estab-
lished standards for resolving the issue of whether a fact is material.
Agurs held that where a defendant has made a request for specifically
designated evidence, the test for materiality is whether the undisclosed
evidence might have affected the outcome of the trial.267 On the other
hand, where the defendant has made only a general request for
favorable evidence or has made no Brady request, the test for material-
ity is whether the undisclosed evidence creates a reasonable doubt that
did not otherwise exist.
268
United States v. Mackey,269 involved a prosecution for attempted
tax evasion and conspiracy to evade payment of taxes. The evidence at
trial established that Mackey had provided money to other individuals
to invest on his behalf in order to hide Mackey's interest from the Inter-
nal Revenue Service. 270 One witness, Carl Smith, testified that he had
received $25,000 from the defendant, and at the defendant's request
had purchased an interest in a real estate firm. Long before that trans-
action, the IRS had interviewed Smith about his possible trafficking in
narcotics. The memoranda of those interviews were not disclosed.
Before trial, the defense counsel had requested "information relat-
ing to material inconsistencies between statements" 27' given by any in-
dividuals whether or not they were prospective government witnesses.
The defense argued that the IRS interview notes would have explained
262. The Hedgeman court explicitly declined to follow the District of Columbia Circuit's posi-
tion in Marshall v. United States, 436 F.2d 155 (D.C. Cir. 1970) that the due diligence standard
was inapplicable in the constitutional issue context. 564 F.2d at 768.
263. 571 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1978).
264. 572 F.2d 1199 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3221 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1978).
265. 373 U.S. at 87.
266. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
267. Id at 104.
268. Id at 112.
269. 571 F:2d 376 (7th Cir. 1978).
270. Id at 380-81 [hereinafter referred to in the text as the IRS].
271. Id at 388.
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the source, iZe., narcotics trafficking of the $25,000 Smith testified he
had received from Mackey. Thus, the failure to provide the interview
notes was alleged to be a violation of Brady.
272
The Seventh Circuit determined that the defense's request for ma-
terial was a "general" request as defined in Agurs. The court also held
that the government had not violated its duty to disclose favorable evi-
dence. 273 The court considered the Supreme Court's admonition in
Agurs: "The prosecutor will not have violated his constitutional duty of
disclosure unless his omission is of sufficient significance to result in the
denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial. ' 274 The Seventh Circuit
held that the determination of whether non-disclosure had deprived a
defendant of a fair trial should be made by the district judge. That
determination will not be overturned under the test set out in Agurs if
the trial court's "first hand appraisal of the record" was "thorough"
and "reasonable. '275 The Mackey court found that the district court
did not err in ruling that fair trial had not been denied, because Smith
had in fact been cross-examined thoroughly and the issue of his possi-
ble narcotics trafficking had been raised.
The defense also argued that the failure to disclose the IRS inter-
view was a violation of the Jencks Act.276 The Seventh Circuit found
no basis for reversing the district court's conclusion that the statement
did not "relate" to Smith's testimony within the meaning of the Act,
and even assuming that it had, failure to produce the statement was
harmless error.
277
United States v. Weidman278 also involved the issue of non-disclo-
sure. The defendant was convicted of mail fraud involving a construc-
tion company of which he was president. The indictment charged that
Weidman and his co-defendants had obtained money, goods and serv-
ices through fictitious and inflated work orders, invoices and purchase
orders during a major steel mill construction project.
279
On appeal, Weidman argued that he was prejudiced by the district
court, which had denied his motion for a new trial. He alleged that the
272. Id
273. Id at 388-89.
274. Id at 388 (citing 427 U.S. at 108).
275. Id at 389 (citing 427 U.S. at 114).
276. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976). This section governs the production of statements made to gov-
ernment agents by government witnesses in criminal cases. Reports and similar materials given
by a government witness are available after the witness has testified against the defendant on
direct examination in open court. Such statements will be available if they relate to the subject
matter on which the witness has testified.
277. 571 F.2d at 389.
278. 572 F.2d 1199 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3221 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1978).
279. Id at 1201.
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government had failed to disclose information relating to a key govern-
ment witness, Cox. Specifically, that information concerned (1) the
government's and Cox's alleged discussions in 1972 about a grant of
full immunity; (2) the government's alleged agreement to recommend
that no fine be imposed on Cox for filing a false income tax return; and
(3) Cox's alleged attempt to bribe an NLRB figure.280
Using the Agurs "materiality" standard for testing non-disclosure,
the Seventh Circuit held that all of the alleged "non-disclosures" were
not sufficiently material to establish any constitutional error.28' Cox
had been granted immunity in 1974 and had testified at trial pursuant
to that grant. The 1974 grant of immunity was disclosed to the defense
and Cox was thoroughly impeached. The Seventh Circuit held that the
lower court's finding that the government did not make a "no fine"
recommendation for witness Cox was not "wholly unsupported by the
evidence." 282 The court also found that failure to disclose any discus-
sion with Cox on this issue was insufficiently material to warrant a new
trial.
On the final point, Cox's alleged attempt to bribe an NLRB offi-
cial, the Seventh Circuit held that no violation of Brady had occurred
because the prosecution did not possess any documents relating to the
alleged attempt and was not even aware of the attempt until the de-
fense requested documents relating to the matter.2 83 Cox was, in fact,
cross-examined by the defense on this issue.
The Seventh Circuit also held that the "statement" made by an
NLRB official which purported to set forth an account of an interview
with Cox, but which Cox refused to sign or read, was not producible at
trial under the Jencks Act.284 The court also noted that, even assuming
the NLRB "statement" was producible, the government's failure to do
so did not prejudice Weidman so as to warrant a new trial.285
The court also addressed a Jencks Act issue in United States v.
Consolidated Packaging Corp. ,286 in which a corporation was found
guilty of participating in a price fixing conspiracy in violation of the
Sherman Act. The corporation alleged that it was prejudiced by the
trial court's refusal to require disclosure of government counsel's mem-
280. Id at 1203.
281. Id at 1208.
282. Id at 1205.
283. Id at 1206. The Weidman court relied on (1) the defense knowledge of the matter; (2)
the availability of the NLRB file to the defense by subpoena; and, (3) the lack of knowledge of the
matter by the prosecution.
284. Id at 1207.
285. Id
286. 575 F.2d 117 (7th Cir. 1978).
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oranda of interviews with government witnesses. All of the memo-
randa in question were prepared after interviews with witnesses.
The Seventh Circuit reaffirmed the principle of Palermo v. United
States,287 which stated that the Jencks Act does not require production
of a statement subsequently prepared, no matter how accurate it may
be.288 The court also noted that the defense was apprised of the sub-
stance of the interview in a bill of particulars. Consolidated Packaging
argued that it was prejudiced because a key government witness in-
voked the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and
failed to produce his personal income tax returns. The Seventh Circuit
agreed with the trial court's finding that the records were irrelevant to
the issues on trial. The Court of Appeals also held that the grant of
immunity to a government witness does not broaden the issues or "so
expand relevancy as to permit trial of a witness by defense counsel for
some possible tax violation.
'289
OTHER PRETRIAL DISCOVERY
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit also had occasion to
consider, but not resolve, the issue of discovery to a grand jury witness
of a transcript of his own testimony. In United States v. Clavey,290 the
former sheriff of Lake County, Illinois was charged in an eight-count
indictment specifying four counts of false swearing before a grand jury,
three counts of failure to report income on his tax returns, and one
count of conspiracy to extort funds from a liquor license holder.
Clavey was acquitted of three of the perjury counts, and the extortion
count.2
91
On appeal, Clavey argued, inter alia, that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel because he was denied a transcript of his grand
jury testimony. 292 Clavey argued that he was thus unable to assert his
right to recant his testimony under section 1623(d) of title 18 of the
United States Code293 before indictment. Clavey had appeared before
the grand jury and testified without representation by counsel. After
287. 360 U.S. 343, 352-53 (1959).
288. 575 F.2d at 129.
289. Id at 131.
290. 565 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1977), reh. en banc No. 76-1926 (7th Cir. June 23, 1978).
291. Id at 113.
292. Id
293. 18 U.S.C. § 1623(d) (1976):
Where, in the same continuous court or grand jury proceeding in which a declara-
tion is made, the person making the declaration admits such declaration to be false, such
admission shall bar prosecution under this section if, at the time the admission is made,
the declaration has not substantially affected the proceeding, or it has not become mani-
fest that such falsity has been or will be exposed.
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his appearance, Clavey retained counsel who filed petitions for release
of a transcript. Clavey's unverified petitions alleged that he did not
recall his testimony because of illness. 294 The petition was denied.
The majority of the original Seventh Circuit panel held that in
light of Clavey's failure to submit a verified petition, the district court
did not err in denying Clavey's petition for disclosure. 295 Judge
Swygert filed a vigorous dissent, arguing that a grand jury witness has a
prima facie right to a copy of his own testimony and that, therefore, the
"particularized need" standard should not be applied.296 Judge
Swygert argued further that, even under the "particularized need" stan-
dard, Clavey should have been granted a copy of his own testimony.
297
The Seventh Circuit granted rehearing en banc on the issue of
grand jury transcript disclosure to witnesses. 298 After reargument, the
court of appeals was equally divided on the issue, so the district court's
decision was left standing without order.299 Because the en banc Clavey
court was equally divided, the issue remains unresolved in this circuit.
Judge Swygert voted to reverse the decision and filed a separate
opinion answering the argument that non-disclosure of Clavey's testi-
mony was harmless because the defense of recantation was not avail-
able to him.3°° Judge Swygert strongly criticized the government for
raising the argument "at the last minute." 30' Judge Swygert concluded
that the language of section 1623(d) of title 18 of the United States
Code "has not become manifest" 30 2 and refers to the witness who
desires to recant.
JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND DELIBERATIONS
This past term the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued
a number of decisions relating to control of jury deliberations, the most
significant of which was United States v. Arciniega.30 3 In Arciniega, the
defendants were tried for violations of federal narcotics laws. After the
jury had deliberated for less than an hour, the trial judge permitted the
294. 565 F.2d at 113-14.
295. ld at 115.
296. Id at 120 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
297. Id at 122-24.
298. All other holdings of the original Clavey panel were not affected by the rehearing en
banc. No. 76-1926, Slip. Op. at 2.
299. Id at 1.
300. Id at 2.
301. Id at 3.
302. Id
303. 574 F.2d 931 (7th Cir. 1978).
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jury to separate and return home. The jury returned the following
morning, resumed its deliberations and returned a verdict of guilty.
On appeal, Arciniega contended that the district court committed
reversible error by permitting the jury to separate.304 The Seventh Cir-
cuit disagreed and held that the decision to permit a jury to separate
rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge.30 5 In addition, the
court held that for such a separation to constitute reversible error, there
must be a specific objection by the defense, supported by specific rea-
sons and a showing that the defense was prejudiced by the separa-
tion.3
6
The Arciniega court overruled two previous Seventh Circuit deci-
sions, United States v. D4ntonio30 7 and United States v. Panczko ,30
which had held that it was reversible error to permit a jury to separate
over defense objection even though no actual prejudice to the defend-
ant was shown. 3°9 The Seventh Circuit noted that every other circuit
court of appeals already had taken a position similar to that expressed
in Arciniega,310 a position which had been expressed earlier in the Sev-
enth Circuit by Judge Swygert in his dissent in D'Antonio.
31'
The Seventh Circuit also had occasion to discuss rule 3 1(d) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides a defendant with
the right to poll a jury following the return of its verdict. In United
States v. Shepard,312 four federal prisoners were prosecuted for the
murder of a fellow prisoner. Prior to their deliberations, the jury was
instructed that their verdict must be unanimous. The jury found three
defendants guilty and acquitted the fourth prisoner. Following the re-
turn of the verdict, but prior to polling the jury, the trial court made
certain comments which, the appellants later argued, prejudiced the de-
fendants' right to poll thejury.313 Defense counsel then polled the jury,
all of whom confirmed the verdict.
On appeal, the Shepard court examined the purposes behind the
ancient right to poll a jury. The court noted that polling has been de-
304. Id at 932.
305. Id at 933.
306. Id
307. 342 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1965).
308. 353 F.2d 676 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 935 (1966).
309. 574 F.2d at 932.
310. See, e.g., United States v. Menna, 451 F.2d 982 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 963
(1972); Sullivan v. United States, 414 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1969); United States v. Breland, 376 F.2d
721 (2d Cir. 1967); Cardarella v. United States, 375 F.2d 222 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 882
(1967); Hines v. United States, 365 F.2d 649 (10th Cir. 1966).
311. 342 F.2d at 671-72 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
312. 576 F.2d 719 (7th Cir. 1978).
313. Id at 722-23.
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scribed as a substantial right, but is not of constitutional dimension.31 4
The court concluded that the purpose behind polling a jury is not to
invite the individual jurors to change their minds, but to determine if
the verdict was "in truth" unanimous. The Seventh Circuit held that it
was highly unlikely that the court's comments could have prevented a
unanimous verdict. The court noted that the jury had been clearly in-
structed in the necessity of unanimity. In addition, the Shepard court
pointed out that in light of the acquittal of one defendant and the con-
viction of the other three it was unlikely that the majority of jurors
were so overzealous or inflamed that they coerced other jurors.
3 5
In United Stated v. Clavey,316 the Seventh Circuit also addressed
the issue of the proper method to respond to questions from a jury
during its deliberations. In Clavey, while deliberating in the evening
before the day on which they returned their verdict, the jury sent a note
to the trial judge requesting that copies of the instructions be sent to the
jury. The court denied that request, and did not advise counsel of the
request. Later in the same evening, the jury requested instructions
from the court as to the indictment and counts. Again, the trial court
denied the request and failed to advise counsel of the incident. Finally,
on the following morning, the jury asked whether they were required to
find Clavey guilty on count one if they found him guilty on counts two
and three. The trial court replied that the jury should continue its de-
liberations. A short time later, the jury reached its verdict.
317
On appeal, Clavey argued that the trial court erred in dealing with
the jury question. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court
had erred in failing to advise the defense counsel of the jury's ques-
tions. Furthermore, the court held that the judge should have at-
tempted to answer the jury's questions, at least by rereading the
original instructions which related to the jury's difficulty.
318
Despite its conclusion that the trial judge had erred, the Seventh
Circuit held that the error was harmless because the jury's verdict
demonstrated, in the court's opinion, that the jury resolved its doubts in
favor of Clavey.319 Thus, the court reasoned, Clavey could not have
been prejudiced by the judge's failure to answer the jury's questions
because Clavey could not have received a more favorable result from
314. Id at 724.
315. Id at 725.
316. 565 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1977). For additional discussion of this case, see text accompany-
ing notes 289-301 supra.
317. Id at 118.
318. Id at 119.
319. Id




Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that
the defendant be fully advised of the consequences of his plea, particu-
larly regarding the sentence which he may receive. 32 1 The Seventh Cir-
cuit considered the propriety of imposing sentence after the defendant
had moved to vacate his guilty plea in United States v. Bell 322 That
case involved a multiple bank robbery defendant who was transferred
to the Northern District of Illinois after his arrest in Arizona. The trial
judge appointed counsel for Bell only eleven days before trial, and de-
nied Bell's motion for a continuance. Bell entered a plea of guilty on
the day of the trial. Forty-two days prior to his sentencing date, Bell
moved to vacate this plea, arguing that he had entered it under duress,
because of the trial court's denial of Bell's motion for a continuance.
Judge McMillen refused to delay sentencing, and did not rule on the
motion to vacate the guilty plea until six months after sentencing.323
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit noted that it is well settled that a
different standard applies to motions to vacate guilty pleas made before
sentencing. 324 Rule 32(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides: "A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty ...may be made
only before sentence is imposed. . .; but to correct manifest injustice
320. Id at 120.
321. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 provides, in relevant part:
(c) Advice to Defendant. Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court
must address the defendant personally in open court and inform him of, and determine
that he understands, the following: (1) the nature of the charge to which the plea is
offered, the mandatory minimum penalty provided by law, if any, and the maximum
possible penalty provided by law; and (2) if the defendant is not represented by an attor-
ney, that he has the riht to be represented by an attorney at every stage of the proceed-
ings against him and, if necessary, one will be appointed to represent him; and (3) that he
has the right to plead not guilty or to persist in that plea if it has already been made and
he has the right to be tried by a jury and at that trial has the right to the assistance of
counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him, and the right not
to be compelled to incriminate himself; and (4) that if he pleads guilty or nolo con-
tendere there will not be a further trial of any kind, so that by pleading guilty or nolo
contendere he waives the right to a trial; and (5) that if he pleads guiy or nolo con-
tendere, the court may ask him questions about the offense to which he has pleaded, and
if he answers these questions under oath, on the record, and in the presence of counsel,
his answers may later be used against him in a prosecution for perjury or false statement.
(d) Insuring that the Plea is Voluntary. The court shall not accept a plea of guilty or
nolo contendere without first, by addressing the defendant personally in open court, de-
termining that the plea is voluntary and not the result of force or threats or of promises
apart from a plea agreement. The court shall also inquire as to whether the defendant's
willingness to plead guilty or nolo contendere results from prior discussions between the
attorney for the government and the defendant or his attorney.
See generally Haddad, supra note 16, at 310; 1977 Circuits Note, supra note 4, at 437-51, 601-16.
322. 572 F.2d 579 (7th Cir. 1978).
323. Id at 580.
324. Id at 581.
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the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and
permit the defendant to withdraw his plea."
Since the motion to vacate was made well in advance of the sen-
tencing, the Bell court ruled that the defendant's motion should have
been considered and decided. The court held that such a motion to
vacate a guilty plea should be ruled on before sentencing to avoid not
only the appearance of pre-judgment, but also the danger that it will
not be humanly possible to judge the motion by the correct standard.
325
In United States v. Hooper,326 the Seventh Circuit considered the
authority of district judges to impose "split sentences." A split sen-
tence, as provided in section 3651 of title 18 of the United States
Code,327 consists of a period of incarceration and a period of probation
for misdemeanor convictions which carry a maximum sentence of six
months imprisonment. The defendant in Hooper pleaded guilty to a
violation of section 1701 of title 18 of the United Stated Code (delay of
the mail) which carries a maximum sentence of six months. The dis-
trict judge imposed a sentence of four years probation with a special
condition of probation that the defendant spend ninety days in a jail-
type institution. The defendant appealed, arguing that the sentence
was an impermissible "split sentence" which can only apply to the
more serious crimes under section 3651. The government argued that
the requirement that the defendant spend ninety days in a jail-type in-
stitution was a valid condition of probation under section 3651.328
The Hooper court held that the judge's intention to impose either a
"split sentence" or incarceration as a condition of probation was imma-
terial since neither alternative was permissible. 329 The Seventh Circuit
325. Id
326. 564 F.2d 217 (7th Cir. 1977).
327. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1976) provides, in pertinent part:
Upon entering a judment of conviction of any offense not punishable by death or
life imprisonment, any court having jurisdiction to try offenses against the United States
when satisfied that the ends of justice and the best interest of the public as well as the
defendant will be served thereby, may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence
and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and condi-
tions as the court deems best.
Upon entering a judgment of conviction of any offense not punishable by death or
life imprisonment, if the maximum punishment provided for such offense is more than
six months, any court having jurisdiction to try offenses against the United States, when
satisfied that the ends ofjustice and the best interest of the public as well as the defend-
ant will be served thereby, may impose a sentence in excess of six months and provide
that the defendant be confined in a jail-type institution or a treatment institution for a
period not exceeding six months and that the execution of the remainder of the sentence
be suspended and the defendant placed on probation for such period and upon such
terms and conditions as the court deems best.
328. 564 F.2d at 218.
329. Id at 221. The trial judge had provided that Hooper was to be permitted to leave the
Metropolitan Correctional Center each day to engage in drug counseling. Id at 221. The court of
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sympathized with the trial court's attempt to fashion a "custom-made"
solution which would be of maximum benefit to both the defendant
and society, but held that the statutory sentencing scheme provided by
Congress did not permit the sentence imposed.330
United States Y. Shelby331 also involved consideration of the au-
thority of the sentencing court under section 3651. In Shelby, a bank
robbery defendant was sentenced to a period of incarceration and pro-
bation, with a requirement that the defendant make restitution in such
amounts and at such times as directed by the probation department.
The Seventh Circuit court held that the sentence, as it related to restitu-
tion, was too vague. No maximum limitation was set by the court to
correspond to the actual loss resulting from the offenses of which
Shelby was convicted. 332 The case was remanded for imposition of res-
titution falling within the limits of section 3651.333
APPEALS
Section 1291 of title 28 of the United Stated Code grants courts of
appeals jurisdiction to review "all final decisions" of the district courts,
both civil and criminal.334 In Abney v. United States,335 the United
States Supreme Court stated, "[I]t is well settled that there is no consti-
tutional right to an appeal. . . . The right of appeal, as we presently
know it is purely a creature of statute; in order to exercise that statutory
right of appeal one must come within the terms of the applicable stat-
ute. .... -336 The Supreme Court noted that "[a]dherence to this rule
of finality has been particularly stringent in criminal prosecutions. '337
The standard of review of federal trial proceedings permits reversal
appeals believed that the trial judge attempted to assist the defendant's rehabilitation while also
protecting society.
330. The court of appeals found that the legislative history and the statutory language limited
the use of split sentences to more serious offenses-when the maximum punishment provided is
more than six months. See 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1976).
331. 573 F.2d 971 (7th Cir. 1978).
332. Id at 976.
333. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1976) provides that the sentencing court can require the defendant "to
make restitution or reparation to aggrieved parties for actual damages or loss caused by the of-
fense for which conviction was had."
334. 28 U.S.C. § 3651 (1976) provides, in pertinent part:
The courts of a als shall have jurisdiction from appeals from all final decisions of
the district courts oF&e United States.. . except where direct review may be had in the
Supreme Court.
See generally 1977 Circuits Note, supra note 4, at 631-47.
335. 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
336. Id at 656-57.
337. Id at 657.
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only when the trial court has abused its broad discretion. 338
In United States v. Rothman,339 the Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit considered the standard for appellate review of the denial
of a motion for a continuance. Rothman involved a mail fraud prose-
cution. The trial was begun approximately six weeks after counsel was
appointed. The Rothman court emphasized the welsettled rule that an
order denying a motion for a continuance is not subject to review un-
less there is a clear showing of abuse of discretion.340 The court also
said that no mechanical tests can be applied and that the circumstances
of each case must be examined. 34' The court noted that while defense
counsel argued that he had inadequate time to prepare, he did not in-
terview any of the known witnesses prior to trial. The Seventh Circuit
found that District Judge Marshall had not abused his discretion by
denying the defendant's motion for a continuance.342
PROBATION AND PAROLE
Congress has granted federal courts broad sentencing powers.
343
Title 18 grants a district court the power to suspend sentence and place
defendants on probation when the court is satisfied that the "ends of
justice" will be satisfied. 3 "4 Congress also has authorized the United
States Parole Commission to grant parole release to prisoners condi-
tional on good behavior.
345
In Morrissey v. Brewer,346 the Supreme Court held that due proc-
ess requires that certain articulated rights be accorded to a parolee dur-
ing a parole revocation proceeding. The Seventh Circuit considered
one aspect of the "minimum requirements of due process" for proba-
338. United States v. Medina, 552 F.2d 181, 192 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 839 (1977);
United States v. Orzechowski, 547 F.2d 978, 982 (7th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 431 U.S. 906 (1977).
339. 567 F.2d 744 (7th Cir. 1977).
340. Id at 747 (citing United States v. Collins, 435 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1970), cerl. denied, 401
U.S. 957 (1971)).
341. Id at 747 (citing Unger v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 589 (1964)).
342. Id at 748-49.
343. See 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1976). See also 1977 Circuits Note, supra note 4, at 684-87.
344. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1976).
345. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4218 (Supp. 1977).
346. 408 U.S. 471 (1972). The Morrissey Court held that the minimum due process require-
ments at a parole revocation proceeding include:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee of
evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heardin person and to present witnesses and
documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses
(unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation);
(e) a "neutral and detached' hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members
of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the
factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole.
Id at 489. See generally 1977 Circuits Note, supra note 4, at 675-84. See also 18 U.S.C. § 4214
(1976).
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tion revocation proceedings in United States v. Davi/a.347 The Seventh
Circuit stated in its opinion: "It is clear from the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Gagnon v. Scarpelli348 that the minimum requirements of due
process which govern the revocation of probation are precisely the
same as those established in Morrissey v. Brewer. ' 349 The Davila court
held that the requirement of "notice" of alleged violations of probation,
enunciated in Morrissey and Gagnon, meant that written notice of al-
leged violations is required before a final hearing.350 The court also
held that receipt by the probationer of written notice at the time of the
final revocation hearing is inadequate.
35'
In United States v. Smith,352 the Seventh Circuit considered the
issue of what standard must be used in determining whether a proba-
tioner has violated his probation. Smith had been placed on probation
for firearm offenses. The first condition of Smith's probation was that
he refrain from violating any law. The government brought probation
revocation charges against Smith, alleging that he had participated in
the armed robbery of a female letter carrier. Smith also was charged
with armed robbery by the state for the same offense. The revocation
hearing occurred prior to the state trial.353 At the conclusion of the
hearing, the district court revoked Smith's probation, saying that it was
"reasonably satisfied" that Smith had committed armed robbery. The
Seventh Circuit held that this was the appropriate standard. 354 The
court held that whether Smith was later acquitted of the state armed
robbery charge was immaterial. The court reasoned that a stricter stan-
dard would be against the public interest in that a "poor risk convicted
felon" might be permitted to remain at large.
355
In Bryant v. Grinner,356 the Seventh Circuit clarified the standard
to be applied in determining whether delays between the execution of
parole violation warrants and parole revocation hearings are unreason-
able. In Bryant, the district court held that a 125 day delay before a
347. 573 F.2d 986 (7th Cir. 1978).
348. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
349. 573 F.2d at 987.
350. Id at 987.
351. Id at 987-88.
352. 571 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1978).
353. Smith was acquitted of the state charges. Id at 372-73.
354. Id at 372. Seven other federal circuits have approved this standard. United States v.
Manuszak, 532 F.2d 311 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v. Strada, 503 F.2d 1081 (8th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Carrion, 457 F.2d 808 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Bryant, 431 F.2d 425 (5th
Cir. 1970); United States v. Nagelberg, 413 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1010
(1970); United States v. Cates, 402 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1968); Yates v. United States, 308 F.2d 737
(10th Cir. 1962).
355. 571 F.2d at 372-73 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)).
356. 563 F.2d 871 (7th Ci. 1977).
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parole revocation hearing was unreasonable, and ordered the parolee's
immediate release.357 The Seventh Circuit noted that the district court
properly applied the rule, as enunciated in United States ex rel Hahn v.
Revis, 358 and Johnson v. Holley,359 that an irrebutable presumption of
prejudice arises from a delay of more than three months, and requires
the prisoner's revocation and release.
However, the Seventh Circuit abrogated the Hahn and Johnson
rule in United States ex rel Sims v. Sielaff,360 in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in Moody v. Daggott.36 ' In reviewing the facts of
Bryant, the court found that relief was not warranted. Specifically, the
court noted that Bryant was afforded a preliminary hearing three days
after the parole violation warrant was executed.362 The prisoner admit-
ted violating the conditions of his release, waived appointment of coun-
sel, and requested that a parole revocation proceeding be held after his
arrival at the designated institution.363 The court noted that delays far
in excess of 125 days had passed muster under Barker v. Wingo. 364 The
court also found it significant that there was no showing that the delay
had prejudiced the prisoner.365 Finally, the Bryant court pointed out
that the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act of 1976 requires
that hearings be held within three months for individuals in Bryant's
position. 366 The sponsors of the bill stated that the proper remedy for
failure to meet the deadline would be to compel the decision and not to
357. Id at 871.
358. 520 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1975), vacated, 560 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1977). A federal parolee
serving time on a state sentence based on conduct occurring during his parole, against whom a
federal parole violation warrant has been lodged with the state prison authorities, has a right to a
reasonably prompt disposition of the parole violation charge.
359. 528 F.2d 116 (7th Cir. 1975). The court held that questions relating to the delay in hold-
ing the parole revocation hearing and the necessity for counsel at that hearing depended on facts
not inquired into by the district court. Therefore, the Seventh Circuit court remanded the case,
commenting that unless some substantial part of the four-month delay in holding the petitioner's
revocation hearing was found to be attributable to the petitioner, the delay was unreasonable. Id
at 119.
360. 563 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1977).
361. 429 U.S. 78 (1976). The Moody Court held that a federal parolee, imprisoned for federal
crimes committed while on parole and clearly constituting parole violations, was not constitution-
ally entitled to an immediate parole revocation hearing, where a parole violator warrant was is-
sued but not executed.
362. 563 F.2d at 872.
363. Id
364. 407 U.S. 514 (1972). The Sims court held that the standards of Barker are to be used in
determining whether a prisoner's right to a speedy trial has been violated. In Barker, the United
States Supreme Court held that a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial cannot be estab-
lished by any inflexible rule, but can be determined only on an ad hoc balancing basis, in which
the conduct of the prosecution and that of the defendant are weighed. The court should assess
such factors as the length of and reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and
prejudice to the defendant.
365. Id.
366. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4218 (Supp. 1977).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
release the prisoner.367
HABEAS CORPUS AND PRISONERS' RIGHTS
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered several
issues relating to the constitutional rights of prisoners. One of the more
significant cases decided in this area, Lono v. Fenton,368 resulted in an
en banc decision reversing an earlier panel decision. Kenneth Lono
was a state prisoner who was transferred to federal custody pursuant to
section 5003 of title 18 of the United State Code. 369 Lono argued that
section 5003 authorizes such transfers only upon a showing that the
prisoner is in need of specialized treatment unavailable in the state sys-
tem. Lono also contended that due process requires a hearing on that
question before any administrative transfer.
370
The Seventh Circuit panel, in an opinion written by Judge
Bauer,371 held that section 5003 does not limit transfer of state prison-
ers into federal custody to those in need of specialized medical care or
rehabilitative treatment. The case was reheard en banc, and a majority
of the Seventh Circuit, speaking through Judge Wood, construed the
legislative history of section 5003 to permit transfers of state prisoners
to federal custody only upon a showing that the prisoner is in need of
specialized treatment unavailable in the state system.372 The majority
also held that due process required that Lono be accorded a hearing on
the issue of transfer.
373
The dissenting members of the Lono court 374 argued that the ma-
jority was straining to find language limiting such transfers. For exam-
ple, the dissenters argued that the requirement that the director of the
Bureau of Prisons certify the availability of "proper and adequate
treatment facilities and personnel" 375 should not have been construed
as a substantive limitation. The dissent noted that there was an appar-
ent discrepancy between the statutory language and the legislative his-
367. 563 F.2d at 872.
368. 581 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1978).
369. 18 U.S.C. § 5003 (1976) provides, in pertinent part:
(a) The Attorney General, when the Director shall certify that proper and adequate
treatment facilities and personnel are available, is hereby authorized to contract with the
proper officials of a State or Territory for the custody, care, subsistence, education, treat-
ment, and training of persons convicted of criminal offenses in the courts of such State or
Territory.
370. 581 F.2d at 646.
371. Lono v. Fenton, No. 77-1141 (7th Cir. Feb. 21, 1978). Judge Wood dissented.
372. 581 F.2d at 646.
373. Id
374. Judges Bauer, Pell and Sprecher dissented.
375. 581 F.2d at 649.
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tory only because the committee reports were more concerned with
explaining the need for the legislation than examining its substance.
376
The dissent also pointed out that the majority's construction of the stat-
ute, some twenty-five years after enactment, jeopardized longstanding
contractual relationships with many states.
377
In 1973, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recognized
that prisoners have due process rights of access to the courts.378 Re-
cently, in Ford v. Schmid, 379 the court considered whether the regula-
tions of the Wisconsin State Prison violated the prisoners' right of
access. The prison maintained a "no passing" rule which prohibited
inmates from passing property to one another without authorization.
380
A prisoner had attempted to mail legal papers using another prisoner's
mail coupon. The Seventh Circuit held that the "no passing" rule was
reasonable and did not unduly interfere with the prisoner's right of ac-
cess to the courts.
381
In Ford v. Caballo,382 a case arising out of Schmidt, the issue was
whether the State of Wisconsin was entitled to reimbursement by the
United States for the costs of transporting and guarding the plaintiff
prisoner between state and federal custody. When the prisoner Ford
initiated civil suit, the district court had issued a writ of habeas corpus
ad prosequendum 383 directed to both the prison warden and the United
States Marshall. The Marshall advised the State of Wisconsin that the
United States would not transport the prisoner.
384
Following the trial, the state sought to recover its costs. The dis-
trict court denied the request, on the grounds that Mfoeck v.
ZajackowskiP85 had previously held that the state was not entitled to
compensation for transporting prisoners. The Seventh Circuit reversed
the district court's decision, holding that Moeck stood for the proposi-
tion that Wisconsin could not transport state prisoners to state civil tri-
als and refuse to do so for federal prisoners.
386
The Caballo court concluded that the district court had jurisdic-
376. Id
377. Id
378. Knell v. Bensingor, 489 F.2d 1014 (7th Cir. 1973).
379. 577 F.2d 408 (7th Cir. 1978).
380. Id at 409.
381. Id at 410.
382. 577 F.2d 404 (7th Cir. 1978).
383. Habeas corpus ad prosequendum is a writ which issues when it is necessary to remove a
prisoner in order to prosecute in the proper jurisdiction wherein the act was committed. State ex
rel. Deeb v. Fabisinski, 111 Fla. 454, 152 So. 207, 210 (1933).
384. Id at 405-06.
385. 541 F.2d 177 (7th Cir. 1976).
386. 577 F.2d at 406.
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tion under the All Writs Act 387 to issue the writ of habeas corpus re-
quiring the state prisoner's presence. However, the court noted that the
Supreme Court had held in United States v. New York Telephone Co. 
388
that federal courts could not impose burdens on third parties without
limit: "Unreasonable burdens may not be imposed. '389 The Seventh
Circuit went on to conclude that it was an abuse of discretion to refuse




The United State Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ad-
dressed numerous criminal procedure issues during its past term. Be-
cause of the great numbers of criminal cases which are customarily
presented to the court, it is rare that truly novel issues are addressed.
The court's work on the myriad issues that it did address was of com-
mendably high quality and should be praised.
The court's greatest challenge in the years ahead will involve such
areas as further interpretation of the Supreme Court's decisions in
Stone v. PowelP91 and Wainwright v. Sykes,392 and statutory interpreta-
tion of acts such as those permitting electronic surveillance and provid-
ing for speedy trials. It can be expected that the Seventh Circuit will
continue to guide the development of the law in criminal procedure
with its detailed interpretations of the issues presented.
387. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1976) provides:
The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all
writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the
usages and principles of law.
388. 434 U.S. 159 (1977).
389. Id at 172.
390. 577 F.2d at 408.
391. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
392. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
